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A Case against the Simultaneous Use of Market Access Restrictions, Domestic Support,  
and Export Subsidies 
 
Abstract:  The Uruguay Round of GATT introduced market disciplines to international trade 
in agricultural commodities.  However, in cases where countries negotiated the right to limit 
market access, support domestic production at high levels and subsidize exports, the spirit of 
the WTO rules have been violated.  The Norwegian meat market (beef, pork, lamb and 
mutton, and chicken) situations are studied in terms of the policy implications and WTO 
commitments.   If Norway's policy objective is to target some level of production that 
satisfies its non-trade concerns, then semi-decoupled income support could be an 
improvement over a policy mix that simultaneously restricts market access, provides 
domestic support and applies export subsidies. 
 





  The Uruguay Round (UR) of GATT is credited with having introduced market 
disciplines to international agricultural trade through the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AonA).  Prior to the UR-GATT, agricultural trade was distorted directly through prohibitive 
tariffs, quotas, unrestricted use of domestic support and export subsidies.  Despite coherent 
rules for which agricultural commodities are to be traded, there are cases in which countries 
negotiated the right to restrict market access, to provide high levels of domestic support, and 
to subsidize export, violating the spirit of the WTO rules if not the intent.   
 
  The purpose of this study is to report on how simultaneous use of various policy 
measures, as defined and permitted under current rules, have in some cases undermined the 
disciplines to which WTO Members have pledged themselves.  The objective is to analyze 
the meat (beef, pork, lamb/mutton and chicken) market situations in Norway since the 
implementation of the WTO Agreements, assessing the compliance implications of existing 
policies.  The meat policy regime, negotiated by Norway and accepted multilaterally, is 
studied as a case for how foreign negotiators might approach the upcoming multilateral talks 
to seek greater liberalization while respecting the concerns that Norwegian society has for its 
agricultural and rural sector. 
 
 
Norwegian Policy Objectives 
 
  Norwegian agricultural policy is aimed at maintaining high levels of agricultural 
activity in all parts of the country, implying that agriculture cannot be simply measured in 
terms of the ability to produce food.  Agricultural policy has four principal objectives, 
ensuring that agriculture contributes to: (1) rural development, employment and settlement; 
(2) supply of environmental public goods, linked to the preservation of the rural landscape;  2
(3) long-term food security; and (4) consumer welfare linked to production methods that 
improve the health of animals and plants (Royal Ministry of Agriculture; OECD; WTOd). 
 
  The WTO recognizes the multifunctional role of agriculture (Article 20, WTO 
AonA), giving Members the right to satisfy non-trade concerns related to food security, rural 
viability, cultural heritage, land conservation, maintenance of rural landscapes and agro-
biological diversity in a manner consistent with WTO rules (GATT).  Market access 
limitations (protection for domestic producers), high levels of price and income support 
(domestic support) with production controls, and export subsidies are features of the policy 
regime.  
 
  The policy debate on multifunctionality and non-trade concerns centers around the 
degree to which trade liberalization undermines legitimate domestic social policy objectives, 
and the appropriate policy response (agricultural protection, or indirect versus direct support), 
as embodied in WTO rules, to achieve those objectives.  This essentially involves a 
determination of how direct is the link between agricultural production activity and the other 
functions performed as a result of production activity, i.e., the jointness of production with 
improved environmental and social conditions, with rural community development and 
economic viability, and with security through stable food supplies (Anderson; Bohman et al.).  
 
 
Meat Sector in Norway 
 
  In the past 30 years, total production of meat in Norway has increased on aggregate 
and for each of the meats studied, except for lamb and mutton, which has declined slightly 
relative to the highs in the mid-1990s.  Production of meat as a percentage of domestic 
availability, defined as production plus imports, has essentially been maintained at 100% for 
each of the meats.  Between 1990 and 2000, production exceeded consumption in beef for 
most years, and about half the years in pork and lamb and mutton.  Chicken production has 
been practically the same as consumption.  (Market data are reported in the appendix.) 
 
  The annual per capita consumption of each meat type varied considerably during 
1990-2000 with chicken consumption increasing at a rate of 5.91%, pork at 1.72%, beef at 
0.5% and lamb and mutton consumption declining by 0.23% per capita per year.  While meat 
consumption in Norway is highly tied to price and real income as in other countries, per 
capita consumption is not comparable to the levels in other industrialized countries, 
reflecting, in large part, the much higher relative prices of meat (Nersten; Rickertsen).  In the 
absence of market access limitations and domestic support, Norway is expected to be a net 
importer of meat products because domestic meat prices exceed border prices.   
 
 




  Prior to the UR, Norway had quantitative import restrictions.  Meat was imported 
only to stabilize prices on the internal market.  A result of the UR, the WTO principle of 
tariffs as the only means of protection applied also to agricultural trade, requiring the 
conversion of quotas into tariffs.  For products for which the historical imported quantity was  3
less than 3% of consumption (of the base year) a minimum access quota was established 
through a tariff-rate quota (TRQ).  The quotas expanded over the 1995-2000 implementation 
period.  In Table 1, the TRQs for meat, each of which is administered under an import 
auctioning system, are presented along with the actual imports of meat and the quota rents 
from the auction (Morttjernsberg).  Only in the case of lamb and mutton is the fill rate (of the 
TRQ) greater than 90% over the period.  For pork, imports exceeded 90% of the quota only 
in the second half of the period.  For beef, the fill rate peaked at 81% (excluding 2001), and 
for chicken, the fill rate was less than 5%, except for 2000.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  The tariff-only regime has not led to significant increases in food imports as feared by 
many farmers.  This is due to the fact that imported goods still had higher prices than 
Norwegian product prices.  Norwegian negotiators used domestic prices that were 
substantially higher than the average market price in the base period (1986-88) in their 
calculation of the tariff equivalent.  The specific tariffs were set equal to the difference 
between the upper price level in Norway and the border price.  The ad valorem tariffs on 
meat were calculated by dividing the specific tariff by the border price multiplied by 100% 
(Nersten).  The base period tariffs ranged between 341% (for chicken) and 505% (lamb and 
mutton).  Reduction commitments brought meat tariffs down to between 290% and 429%.   
 
  The targeted import volume specified under the TRQ is not a guaranteed import level, 
but rather the binding commitment on market access over which future limitations cannot be 
made stricter (Abbott and Morse).  In theory, for a targeted volume of imports, Qq, under the 
market access quota (MAQ), setting a tariff rate that achieves the result is a straightforward 
matter.  In practice, it appears as if in-quota tariff rates were negotiated without the intention 
to import Qq.  For Norway, the in-quota tariffs, in ad valorem terms, ranged from between 
109% and 162% for meat and the actual quantity imported averaged less than 60% of the 
MAQs for meat.  Hence, the higher out-of-quota tariffs (which are the MFN bound tariff rates 
that apply for all import in excess of Qq) were never applied.  Price data and the in-quota 
tariffs for meat are reported in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
   In cases where the MAQ was never met, there are a few plausible explanations: in-
quota tariffs were set so high such that too few imports entered; transactions costs associated 
with importing when added to the price of the imported meat caused import prices to increase 
relative to the price of the domestic product; the quota level was set too high relative to 
import demand (at domestic prices); or that import demand has declined (since the time of the 
negotiations) such that the negotiated quota cannot be binding (Abbott and Morse; Abbott 
and Paarlberg; Boughner, de Gorter and Sheldon).  However, to understand TRQ underfill in 




  Domestic support is concentrated on a few products, namely dairy, beef and pork 
which together accounted for some three-quarters of Norway's agricultural support.  
Livestock producers received price and income support, as target prices were set above the 
world price, but below the domestic regulated market price.  Farmer-owned meat associations  4
implement the market stabilizing regulations through price-setting, storage functions, 
coordinating imports and exports (in cooperation with private firms) and through sales 
promotion programs (IMC).   
 
  Livestock production is affected by the prices of other protected agricultural sectors 
which serve as inputs into meat production, such as feed grains and feed concentrates.  Prices 
of feed grain and concentrates were regulated to keep livestock production in line with 
demand and to stimulate domestic fodder production.  Grain prices were fixed at high rates 
and have not responded directly to market forces.  In the case of chicken, feed adjustment 
support was provided.  To keep farm income at desirable levels, a substantial part of the 
farmers' income is secured by way of non-price support (i.e., income support or blue box 
measures).  These measures and other green box support are differentiated according to the 
size of production and the geographical location within Norway.  A base deficiency payment 
is granted to livestock producers.  In addition, regionally differentiated payments are paid to 
meat producers in the central and northern parts of Norway.  There are also subsidies given to 
reduce transport costs of livestock from remote farms to processing centers (IMC). Table 3 
reports on domestic support to livestock and meat producers. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Norway negotiated a bound rate of 13.8 million NOK in total aggregate measure of 
support (AMS) in 1995 which required 26% reductions over the implementation period.  
However, actual support levels were below the bound rates throughout the period, increasing 
in percentage terms (from about 70% in 1995 to more than 90% by 2000) as the bound rates 
declined according to the reduction commitments (WTOe).  This suggests that the bound rates 
on AMS, which Norway negotiated, were higher than necessary.  The composition of 
domestic support across all agricultural activity is 18% green box, 34% blue box, and the 
remaining 48% is amber box (WTOa).  While the tendency is that Norway has made progress 




  The right to subsidize exports serves as a valve to release the downward pressure on 
domestic prices when domestic production is high relative to demand.  Export subsidies were 
negotiated for each of the meat categories.  Bound rates of export subsidies were determined 
in terms of their value (budgetary outlays) and the volume exported.  Table 3 shows the 
bound commitments and the reduction commitments on export subsidies in volume and value 
terms. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  Actual subsidized exports are less than the bound rates in volume and value on an 
annual basis.  However, for some years, the actual rates exceeded the bound limits for that 
year.  Some Member countries opted to transfer allotments across years.  That explains why, 
for example, beef and pork exports exceeded the bound rate for 1999.  The use of export 
subsidies reflects the importance of a release mechanism to maintain beef and pork prices.  It 
was used to a lesser extent for lamb and mutton and not exercised at all in the case of 
chicken.  The net trade situation supports the claim that the trade regime existed to stabilize 
and maintain high domestic prices.    5
Simple Model of the Meat Markets 
 
  The objective of this study is to analyze the meat market situation since the 
implementation of the WTO Agreements, assessing the compliance of the existing policy 
regime. From the production information reported in the appendix table and the notification 
data reported in Tables 1-4, it is possible to model the market situation in Norway.  The 
evidence shows the country as a net exporter of each meat, except for chicken.  The border 
price, PB, is the average price of imports divided by the quantity imported.  By adding the 
specific tariff rate (in each case the specific tariff was applied on imported meats) and the 
cost of the quota (i.e., the fee in this case is the bidding price from the auction on an average 
kilo of imported meat) to PB, the domestic price, PD, can be computed.  Alternatively, given 
that export subsidies are used to sell the surplus (to maintain PD) the government pays PD - 
PB. 
 
  In Figures 1-3, the market situations that characterize the Norwegian meat markets are 
presented in sets of two-panel diagrams.  On the left-hand side are the market situations 
within the internal market, the gross trade flows, and the revenue or outlay associated with 
the different policy (domestic support, tariff revenue, export subsidy).  On the right-hand side 
is the characterization of the market in a net trade setting.  
 
  The maximum domestic availability (DA) is defined as production (Q) plus imports 
(M).  The internal price of each of the meats is supported at its respective price, PD, which is 
always greater than the target price, PT, of meat (except chicken), which in turn is higher than 
PB (ICA). Part of the domestic support that is received by producers comes in the form of a 
price support (amber box) and another part in the form of coupled income support (blue box). 
Tariff revenues and the quota fee apply to the import volume (a revenue equal to PT - PB) and 
the export subsidy is applied to the volume of exports (a per unit cost of PD - PB). 
 
  Three cases summarize the market situations of the four meats for the period.  The 
cases of beef and pork (for each year except 1998 and 1999 for pork) are described in Figure 
1.  For the overall period, domestic beef and pork production exceeds consumption, the fill 
rates on the market access quota are substantially less than 100%, and the volume of 
(subsidized) exports exceeds the imported volume.   In panel b, the quantity of imports, 
which is added to domestic supply, enters Norway at the border price plus the in-quota tariff 
and the quota fee from the auction.  It is assumed that foreign meat is sold at PD, the price at 
which domestic beef and pork is also sold.  The box formed by area 1234 is equal to the value 
of the export subsidy while the box enclosing area a relates to the amber box price support.    
 
[Figures 1-3 about here] 
 
  In Figure 2, the cases of lamb and mutton and pork (for 1998 and 1999) are 
represented by the market situations depicted in panels a and b.  Domestic production 
exceeds consumption, the fill rate on the quota is between 90 and 100 percent, and the 
volume of subsidized export exceeds the volume of imports (and even the MAQ).  In the case 
of chicken, domestic production is almost exactly equal to consumption, the fill rates on the 
TRQ are zero or less than 3%, and exports of chicken were not subsidized.  Hence, Figure 3 
represents a closed market situation.  Despite the increasing rates of growth in per capita 
consumption of chicken, the price is supported and protected by high tariffs at such a rate that 
imports were prohibitive.  6
Policy Implications for the Upcoming WTO Negotiations 
 
  The WTO Ministerial Declaration of 2001 from the ministerial conference in Doha 
(paragraph 13) calls for "fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific 
commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions and 
distortions in world agricultural markets. . .   [Ministers agree to] . . . substantial 
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export 
subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. . .  [Ministers also] 
. . . confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations" (WTOb). 
 
  A negotiator having studied the agricultural market situation of a country that 
simultaneously limits market access, provides domestic support and subsidizes exports must 
develop a negotiating position knowing that the principle counter-position will be related to 
protection of NTCs.  The first argument is that eliminating export subsidies does not present 
any inconsistency with taking NTCs into consideration.  Export subsidies are neither required 
to target some "socially desirable" level of agricultural production, nor an effective means of 
supporting rural activity, nor provides environmental/landscape protection, nor an appropriate 
tool to promote food security.  It represents a volume of production that domestic consumers 
refuse to purchase at prevailing prices, a volume of food greater than under autarky.   
 
   Therefore, the resistance of countries to eliminate export subsidies, especially those 
that also enforce strict limitations on imports, can only be viewed as a violation of rules and 
spirit of the WTO.  However, it is necessary to realize the importance of the export subsidy as 
a release value to support domestic prices.  The elimination of the export subsidy implies that 
either market access limitations or price and/or income support will be required to maintain 
current levels of support.  Semi-decoupled (blue box type) support whereby producers and 
production are supported at some "socially desired" level can permit additional market access 
(with the intention of actually meeting those commitments) and the elimination export of 
subsidies (in value and volume).  This could be an interim strategy for those countries that are 
particularly sensitive to short-term changes in the structure of agriculture. 
 
  Second, the market access limitations under the TRQ involve two tariffs and the 
quota.  However, only one of those policy instruments is effective at a time, implying the 
other two are redundant (Boughner, de Gorter and Sheldon).  In the case of the beef market in 
Norway, the quota fill averaged 58% over the period and the quota was never binding.  This 
implies that the binding constraint is the in-quota tariff (given that demand has not declined 
over time).  Per capita consumption of beef decreased after 1997 but that is more likely a 
function of the 16.5% increase in meat prices after 1996.  
 
  For pork, the quota rate is effectively a binding constraint in 1998-99.  If this 
continues to be the situation, then the negotiators should be inclined to expand the quota level 
in addition to push for reductions in both tariffs.  Annual per capita consumption of pork is 
higher between 1996-2000 than in 1995 as are production levels.  This should not represent a 
case where the amount of the public good is declining.  The surplus pork production suggests 
that trade liberalization could reduce prices and production without a decline in the public 
good; however, income support would have to compensate for the loss in revenue to farmers. 
 
  In lamb and mutton, Norway is a net exporter, but the TRQ fill rate is above 90% 
throughout the period.  Annual per capita consumption steadily declined after 1996 by about  7
one kg by 2000.  The 26% increase in price, on average, after 1996 is likely to be a relevant 
factor.  Production levels mirror the reduction in consumption.  Nevertheless, the binding 
constraint in the TRQ for lamb and mutton is the quota.  For chicken, there are hardly any 
imports given a situation where per capita consumption is increasing substantially and 
reaching record highs.  The binding constraint is the in-quota tariff.  Negotiators could be 
expected to press for much lower tariffs and substantially increased market access. 
 
  Semi-decoupled support could make the TRQ regime inconsequential by ensuring that 
producers' income and production levels remain stable at some desired level.  Supporting 
income at a desired production level while allowing consumers to see a market-determined 
price would likely result in a significantly increased market access.  Consider the Norwegian 
market situation for meat as represented in Figure 4.  Supporting producers' income on a per-
unit basis at PD  would maintain the "socially desirable" level of production, QSD (and the 
current levels of other public goods associated with that level of production).  Total imports 
would be equal the difference between the quantity demanded minus domestic production, or 
QD - QSD, at the border price, PB.  Export subsidies would be completely eliminated and 
market access could be completely liberalized.   
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
  Green box support, it should be debated, can be used to make direct payments to 
achieve other well-defined environmental, landscape, and rural concerns. What would be left 
for Norway to determine is the "socially desirable" level of production in terms of satisfying 
their NTCs and the level of food security.  Self-sufficiency production levels in meat will 
decline, by definition, with additional market access, but the absolute levels of production 
need not change significantly if society is willing to support production at or near current 
levels.  The fact that Norwegians are increasingly traveling to Sweden to purchase meat 
(among other products) is evidence that ever-increasing price differentials will either cause 





  Although the UR-GATT is credited with bringing market disciplines to international 
trade in agricultural products, it is evident that countries simultaneously using domestic 
support, market access limitations and export subsidies have been able to defer gains from 
trade liberalization to consumers in net importing countries and to producers in countries 
which have a comparative advantage.  A more appropriate solution would have been to 
require countries requesting a TRQ to forgo the use of export subsidies altogether, which 
could have brought fill rates in line with market access commitments.  However, it is 
apparent that the use of export subsidies also had the benefit of supporting the internal prices.   
There is circumstantial evidence that Norway negotiated the right to export subsidies with the 
intention to keep production at some targeted level while requiring the consumers to pay for 
higher meat prices and the taxpayer to transfer income directly to producers.  
 
  The interesting issue is that if the policy objective is to target some production level, 
keeping in mind the NTC objectives, then this might only have required semi-decoupled 
income support without the need for export subsidies or restrictive market access limitations. 
If society values the public goods provided by agriculture, then taxpayers would be willing to  8
pay for NTCs directly rather than in the form of higher meat prices and in export subsidies of 
meat.  A more precise study would require an econometric analysis of the meat markets to 
determine the degree to which production is sensitive to support payments and prices and the 
degree to which the quantity demanded (and hence imports) is affected by changes in prices.   9
 
Table 1.  Minimum Access Quotas, Imports and Fill Rates for Meat (metric tons) 
Product  1995 1996 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Beef  quota  181 361 542  723  903  1,084  1,084 
Actual  imports   83  203  433 585  244 307  841 
Fill rate, beef (%)  46  56  80  81  27  28  100
a 
Quota  rents  (NOK)  -  161 1,319 2,748  5,357 212  - 
             
Pork  quota  230 460 691  921  1,151 1,381  1,381 
Actual imports   34  0  75  878  1,150  1,135  213 
Fill rate, pork (%)  15  0  11  95  100  82  17 
Quota rents (NOK)  -  1  15  20  885  1,108  - 
             
Lamb/mutton  quota  34 69 103  137 172  206 206 
Actual  imports    34 63 103  127 166  206 170 
Fill rate (%)  100  90  100  93  97  100  83 
Quota  rents  (NOK)  -  200 206  55  1,068 1,344  - 
             
Chicken  quota  116 137 158  179  200  221  221 
Actual  imports 0 0 0  3  6  34 8 
Fill  rate  (%)  0 0 0  2  3  15 4 
Quota  rents  (NOK)  -  0  2 2  2 18  - 
 
Notes:- is not available; 
aBeef imports exceeded the quota because 2,392 tons of meat  
were imported in 2001 at a duty-free rate from LDCs. 
 
Sources: Norway's WTO notifications, G/AG/N/NOR/ various documents; Sunnevåg, 1999.  
 
  10
Table 2. Price Data on the Meat Market (NOK per kilo) 
Product  1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 
Beef:  
   Border price  20.61  20.53  24.22  27.30  26.19  - 
   In-quota tariff  27.32  27.32  27.32  27.32  27.32  27.32 
   Quota fee  -  0.44  2.43  3.80  5.93  - 
   Domestic price  47.93  46.75  54.48  55.94  54.52  52.71 
   Target price  33.81  35.05  36.20  36.45  36.45  33.95 
   Export subsidy value  -  26.22  30.26  28.64  28.33  - 
Pork:  
   Border price  17.77  17.75  22.81  18.02  15.24  - 
   In-quota tariff  16.87  16.87  16.87  16.87  16.87  16.87 
   Quota fee  -  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.77  - 
   Domestic price  34.64  32.69  41.48  39.17  37.84  36.47 
   Target price  26.31  26.47  26.22  21.87  26.87  23.77 
   Export subsidy value  -  14.94  18.67  21.15  22.60  - 
Lamb and Mutton:   
   Border price  20.69  20.67  27.28  25.84  28.96  - 
   In-quota tariff  19.40  19.40  19.40  19.40  19.40  19.40 
   Quota fee  -  2.90  2.00  0.40  6.21  - 
   Domestic price  40.09  46.89  50.26  38.07  65.86  68.12 
   Target price  36.16  36.39  37.19  37.44  41.44  41.44 
   Export subsidy value  -  26.22  22.98  12.23  36.90  - 
Chicken:  
   Border price  15.91  16.32  12.49  13.41  15.17  - 
   In-quota tariff  9.68  9.68  9.68  9.68  9.68  9.68 
   Quota fee  -  0.001  0.010  0.010  0.010  - 
   Target price  29.90  29.65  29.80  30.55  30.55  27.25 
   Domestic price  25.79  26.00  22.18  23.10  24.86  24.80 
   Export subsidy value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Source: NILF, various issues; Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway; Sunnevåg, 1999.  11
 
 
Table 3.  Domestic Support Programs for Meat (million NOK) 
Product  1995 1996 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Blue  box             
Deficiency  payment    506 512 516  523  512  473  539 
Headage  support  1,871  1,611  1,678  1,748 2,142  2,317 2.265 
         
Amber box, product specific support         
Beef  1,787  1,888  2,054  2,096 2,054  1,805 1,837 
Pork  1,344  1,568  1,544  1,641 1,548  1,245 1,800 
Lamb/mutton  957 897 858  827  899  887  900 
Chicken  395 384 443  578  674  679  672 
 






Table 4. Export Subsidy Commitments, Volume (metric tons) and Value (million NOK) 
Product  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 
Beef      
    volume: bound rate  3,258  2,906  2,554  2,202  1,849  1,497  1,497 
    actual volume subsidized   638  351  1,633  2,301  7,876  1,119  441 
   value: bound rate  n/a  89  75  62  48  35  35 
   actual outlays  n/a  9  49  66  223  33  13 
Pork    
    volume: bound rate  4,631  4,463  4,295  4,127  3,959  3,791  3,791 
    actual volume subsidized   508  429  4,547  818  11,723  1,418  763 
   value: bound rate  n/a  119  111  103  95  87  87 
   actual outlays  n/a  6  85  17  265  26  13 
Lamb and mutton     
    volume: bound rate  831  801  771  741  711  681  681 
    actual volume subsidized   n/a  240  1,097  785  195  30  208 
   value: bound rate  n/a  24  23  21  19  18  18 
   actual outlays  n/a  6  25  10  7  1  5 
Chicken    
    volume: bound rate  27  26  25  24  23  22  22 
    actual volume subsidized   n/a  0  0  0  0  0  0 
   value: bound rate  n/a  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5 
   actual outlays  n/a  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Source: Norway's export subsidy notification to the WTO, WTO documents  
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Panel b. Domestic market and net trade flows
QD = QS
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Appendix .  Table A1. Norwegian Meat Market Situation (metric tons), 1995-2000 





(M - X) 
Consumption 
(Q + M - X) 
Consumption 
per capita (kg) 
Beef:         
1995 85,482 87,198  1,697  87,179  20.05 
1996 86,394 88,946  2,552  88,946  20.35 
1997 89,416 89,619  -697  88,719  20.20 
1998 90,800 90,862  -1,721  89,079  20.16 
1999 95,580 95,748  -7,058  88,522  19.19 
2000 90,870 91,038  -403  83,812  18.72 
Pork:         
1995 95,824 98,901  3,076  98,900  22.75 
1996 103,327 106,987  3,508  106,835  24.45 
1997 105,381 105,697  -3,517  101,864  23.19 
1998 106,400 107,454  625  107,025  24.22 
1999 109,250 110,660  -7,445  101,805  22.90 
2000 102,910 104,253  819  103,729  23.16 
Lamb/mutton:       
1995 26,515 27,175  624  27,139  6.24 
1996 27,161 27,417  238  27,399  6.27 
1997 25,813 25,919  -1,025  24,788  5.64 
1998 23,300 32,527  73  23,373  5.29 
1999 22,950 23,421  -41  22,909  5.15 
2000 23,510 24,383  859  23,469  5.24 
Chicken       
1995 28,633 29,700  1,065  29,698  6.83 
1996 32,425 32,539  113  32,538  7.45 
1997 33,399 33,502  101  33,500  7.63 
1998 24,900 24,985  11  24,911  5.64 
1999 29,460 29,533  68  29,528  6.64 
2000 34,650 34,739  48  34,698  7.75 
Source: UN, FAO, Production and Trade Statistics, available at http://apps.fao.org/ 
 